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Earnings management and audit quality: Stakeholders’ perceptions 
Yasser Barghathi, David Collison, and Louise Crawford 
1. Introduction	
Perceptions of audit quality have recently been identified as a topical and important issue 
as a result of audit failures and corporate collapse (Kilgore et al., 2014). Calls for 
mandatory audit firm rotation and industry specialist auditors on audit quality have been 
made as a result of high-profile accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom (Firth 
et al., 2012; Kilgore et al., 2014; Anis, 2014; Kim et al., 2015). Auditors are assigned 
primarily to increase confidence that financial statements fairly represent the financial 
position of a firm. Earnings management may distort this "fair presentation" and be a real 
concern to auditors. Moreover, auditors will become more worried when management use 
questionable accounting practices (Jones, 2011). The broader accounting quality literature, 
according to Libby et al. (2015), has identified the importance of the external auditor’s role in 
relation to earnings management practices as a potential monitor that may reduce such 
practices. However, auditors are often seen as trying to balance their wish to satisfy the client 
on one hand and to avoid litigation and regulatory consequences on the other hand, as well as 
being concerned about possible reputational damage.  For Stolowy and Breton (2004), 
auditors are dealing with two important objectives; satisfying the client and avoiding risk 
from third parties.  
This paper examines the perceptions of various stakeholders in relation to audit quality. Its 
primary objective is to capture the experiences of a range of stakeholders in relation to the 
audit quality of Libyan Commercial Banks (LCBs) by seeking their perceptions regarding 
the issue of earnings management. This paper investigates whether stakeholders' think 
auditors are able to detect and prevent earnings management practices by LCBs and 
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therefore provide a good quality audit.  Research on audit quality in Libya has been 
relatively limited and calls have been made for more in-depth research on the topic (Zakari 
and Menacere, 2012; Sawan and Alsaqqa, 2013; Sawan and Alzeban, 2015).  More 
generally, earnings management is perceived as a challenging issue by the financial 
reporting community due to its negative impact on financial reporting quality (Ascioglu et 
al., 2012: Habbash et al., 2013),  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on earnings management 
and audit quality, including consideration of audit firm rotation and industry specialization 
as steps that may be taken to address concerns.  The section also includes a brief overview 
of the accounting profession and banking audits in Libya. Section 3 provides the theoretical 
framework adopted by the paper, and Section 4 describes the research methodology. 
Section 5 discusses the paper’s results; both from interviews and a questionnaire survey. 
Section 6 presents the summary and conclusion.  
2. Literature	review	
The following section provides an overview of the literature that explains, first of all, what 
is meant by audit quality and how earnings management can affect it.  The literature on 
two specific approaches to supporting audit quality is also considered, namely; auditor 
rotation and industry specialisation. The focus of this paper is to examine perceptions of 
the audit quality provided to LCBs and so literature pertaining to the regulatory framework 
of accounting in Libya will also be included in this section. 
2.1 EM and Audit quality 
Earnings management has been recognised as an attempt by managers to influence 
financial statements by using specific accounting methods to achieve some self-interested 
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goal (Akers et al. 2007). The external audit, according to Michas (2011), is likely to be 
important in emerging markets where there are no strong legal and financial institutions 
that reduce agency cost, as is arguably the case in Libya. It mitigates the problem of 
information asymmetry (Ojala et al., 2014). In particular, the external auditor plays a 
central role in the deterrence of earnings management behaviour (Cotter, 2012). The 
literature shows that a high quality external audit can have an influential role in reducing 
earnings management practices (Frankel et al., 2002). Audit quality has been defined in the 
literature in various ways and it should be noted that, according to Ojala et al., (2014), it is 
a complex concept that has no single agreed definition. It has been described as the raison 
d'etre of the audit profession since the audit function would be of little or no value if it was 
of doubtful quality (Dickins et al., 2014). Much audit quality research, according to Kilgore 
et al., (2014), draws on DeAngelo's (1981) widely cited definition of audit quality that is 
the auditor's ability to discover and report a breach or misstatement in the accounting 
system or financial statements. Kilgore et al., (2014) report that the literature provides two 
approaches to test for audit quality; the first focuses on the audit process outcome e.g. 
errors made by the auditor resulting in an inappropriate audit opinion and/or deficient 
financial statements,  while the second assesses audit quality from an ex-ante perspective. 
The second approach uses proxies to measure audit quality, e.g. firm size, litigation 
experience, auditor reputation, auditor tenure, non-audit services, audit structure, and 
industry specialisation. However, audit quality based on the second type can also be 
measured by examining the perceptions of individuals who are involved in, or affected by 
the audit (Kilgore et al., 2014). This paper examines audit quality by addressing 
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stakeholders’ perceptions of the ability of the external auditors to detect and prevent the 
practices of earnings management by LCBs’ managers. 
2.2 Auditor firm rotation and audit quality 
It is a “common assumption” that audit firm rotation increases audit quality (Ewelt-Knauer, 
2012, p. 17). However, prior research on auditor independence reveals mixed results in 
regard to the relationship between firm rotation and audit quality. Johnson et al. (2002), for 
example, compared how short audit firm tenure (2-3 years) and medium audit firm tenure 
(4-8 years) would affect the quality of financial reporting. They found that short audit firm 
tenure is associated with lower financial reporting quality. Another study by Carcello and 
Nagy (2004) confirmed the research findings of Johnson et al. (2002). They found that 
fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to exist when there is short audit firm tenure. 
Cameran et al. (2008) tested how mandatory audit firm rotation would affect audit quality 
and found that there are no beneficial effects on audit quality as a result of mandatory audit 
firm rotation. Jackson et al. (2008) investigated the effect of mandatory audit firm rotation 
on audit quality in Australia and found that audit quality increases with audit firm tenure. 
They conclude that given the additional costs associated with switching auditors there are 
minimal, if any, benefits of mandatory audit firm rotation. They also suggested that 
regulators should consider other initiatives to address concerns about auditor independence 
and audit quality before imposing mandatory audit firm rotation. In Indonesia, it is 
compulsory to rotate the auditor every 3 years and to rotate the audit firm every 5 years. 
Siregar et al. (2012) tested the effect of this regulation on audit quality and found that both 
auditor and audit firm rotation did not increase audit quality. They concluded that 
regulators may need to reconsider the regulation in order to increase audit quality. 
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On the other hand, there are some scholars who are in favour of mandatory audit firm 
rotation. Kramer et al. (2011) examined earnings quality using conservatism as a proxy 
(attribute). Their results indicate that conservatism in reported earnings decreases as the 
tenure of the audit firm lengthens. And as a result, they argued, audit firm rotation may 
have a positive impact on earnings quality. A recent study by Kim et al. (2015) investigated 
whether mandatory audit firm rotation enhances audit quality in Korea. Their findings 
suggest that mandatory audit firm rotation leads to better audit quality compared to 
voluntary audit firm rotation. In Libya, the Central Bank requires that a listed auditor can 
only audit a commercial bank for two consecutive financial years after which the auditor 
has to be rotated. In this limited context, and based on the literature reported above, the 
audit quality provided by listed auditors may be expected to be perceived as of good 
quality.  
2.3 Industry specialization and audit quality 
According to Krishnan (2003), specialist auditors are more likely to detect earnings 
management than non-specialists; they have the required experience and resources and are 
armed with an incentive (to maintain their reputation) to constrain earnings management. 
Ultimately reported earnings quality should therefore be enhanced. Industry specialists, 
according to Dunn and Mayhew (2004), possess the required industry specific knowledge 
and expertise and therefore can play a crucial role in monitoring the financial reporting 
process by providing high quality audit services to clients. Specialist auditors, according 
to Lowensohn et al. (2007), are more likely to detect errors in financial statements than 
non-specialist auditors. Bruynseels et al., (2011) report that industry specialist auditors 
provide high audit quality and note that industry specialization is associated with, among 
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other things, lower levels of earnings management.  Dunn and Mayhew (2004) documented 
a positive association between industry specialist auditors and accounting quality in 
unregulated industries. However, they found no relationship in regulated industries.  
The effect of auditor industry specialization on earnings management was also 
acknowledged recently by Sun and Liu (2013), who concluded that auditor industry 
specialization complements corporate governance effectively constraining earnings 
management.  
The previously cited literature provides clear evidence of the ability of specialist auditors 
to better detect and prevent earning management practices, compared to non-specialists. In 
Libya, the Central Bank of Libya maintains a list of auditors who are approved to undertake 
bank audits. In order for an auditor to be listed, he/she has to demonstrate qualification and 
relevant experience, among other requirements. This institutional feature, i.e. the 
requirements by the Central Bank of Libya, provide a distinctive setting in which to explore 
perceptions of audit quality. It provides us with a setting where both mandatory audit firm 
rotation and auditor specialization are regulatory features. Such institutional features have 
been used previously in the literature when choosing a jurisdiction to test for audit quality, 
see, for example, Firth et al. (2012).The next two sub-sections outline respectively the 
regulatory frameworks of auditing and accounting in Libya; and, in particular, the 
regulations concerning banking are described.   
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2.4 Auditing in Libya 
The accounting profession in Libya was governed for the first time by Law No. 116 that 
was enacted in 19731,2 by which the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association 
(LAAA) was established. The ability to supply audit services is restricted to LAAA 
members. Membership of the association requires that a candidate is a Libyan who has an 
accounting degree and who has experience of five years in an accountancy-related job after 
gaining their degree (Ahmed and Gao, 2004; Sawan and Alzeban, 2015). This law covers 
many issues relating to accounting practices in the country; the LAAA is the only 
responsible body to act with legal status in the area of auditing on behalf the State; 
moreover it “manages every facet of the auditing profession” (Ritchie and Khorwatt, 2007, 
p. 41). Ahmed and Gao (2004) summarised the objectives of the law as follows: 
“(i) to organise and improve the conditions of the accounting profession and 
to raise the standards of accountants and auditors professionally, 
academically, culturally and politically; (ii) to organise and participate in 
conferences and seminars related to accounting internally and externally and 
to keep in touch with new events, scientific periodicals, lectures and so on; 
(iii) to establish a retirement pension fund for its members; (v) to increase co-
operation between its members and to protect their rights; and (vi) to take 
action against members who violate the tradition and ethics of the profession” 
(p. 369). 
 
However, Mahmud and Russell (2003) concluded that the LAAA had failed to achieve 
important objectives; for example, to establish or participate in research, conferences, and 
seminars or any activity that may have an influence over the profession’s development. It 
                                                 
1 Before 1952 when Libya gained its independence, there was no national accounting body nor accounting 
firms, business firms at that time were served by foreign accounting firms from Italy and UK (Ahmed and 
Gao, 2004). 
2 During the 1950s and 1960s, most of the accounting firms which worked in Libya were either British or 
American; Libyan accounting firms have existed only since 1970 (Mahmud and Russell, 2003). 
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had, according to Mahmud and Russell (2003), failed even to regulate itself, let alone 
pursue its responsibility towards the public interest. Another critique of the LAAA by 
Mahmud and Russell (2003) was that the LAAA did not yet have a code of ethics. 
In addition to the above critiques, Mahmud (1997) pointed out that the LAAA has failed 
to either organise or participate in any programmes that would develop the profession; in 
addition it was, at that time, unsuccessful in updating the profession about recent 
developments. He concluded based on the above, that the accounting profession in Libya 
was very weak3. El-Firjani (2010) concluded that the LAAA had had no real impact on the 
accounting profession in Libya, and, in particular, that it had failed to develop accounting 
practices. He added that accounting practices in Libya are mainly dependent on statutory 
regulations. However, it is worth noting that the LAAA attempted in 2006 to prepare 
national accounting standards by issuing the first Exposure Draft of a number of Libyan 
Accounting Standards (EDLASs). This draft consisted of 29 accounting standards mainly 
based on IFRS/IAS. However, due to weakness in the enforcement system, this draft is still 
not mandatory (El-Firjani, 2010). The accounting profession, according to El-Firjani 
(2010), is still immature as it is in the early stages of developing accounting practices. 
Moreover, a shortcoming of the LAAA, according to Sawan and Alezban (2015), is that it 
has not undertaken any classification of Libyan audit firms in terms of the number of staff, 
revenue, and resources. Such information could be of great interest in audit quality research 
in Libya. 
Accounting practices in Libya have been influenced by a number of factors, one of which 
is the accounting education system (Mahmud and Russell, 2003); in this and other aspects 
                                                 
3 This situation still remains the case, and it may of course be even worse. As with other Libyan institutions, 
the LAAA is having to cope with the disruption caused by the Libyan revolution and its aftermath.   
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it has been influenced by Western accounting since “applied accounting principles and 
auditing standards in Libya follow those of the U.K. and the U.S” (Mahmud and Russell, 
2003. p. 201)4. Another factor that may have had an influence over the accounting 
profession in Libya as identified by Ahmed and Gao (2004) is the discovery of oil. Since 
the late 1950s, when oil was discovered, the development of economic activities in Libya 
has resulted in more reliable accounting information becoming required for many users 
including management, investors, and government (El-Firjani, 2010). 
2.5 The Libyan Commercial Banks Audit 
The quality of the external audit is unobservable, however it can arguably be measured to 
some extent by, inter alia, auditor tenure (Piot and Janin, 2007). Libyan Commercial Banks 
are subject to supervision by the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) according to Banking Law 
no. 1 of 2005. The CBL, according to Article 71, is responsible for monitoring and 
controlling all commercial banks that operate within the country. Moreover, 
interrelationships between commercial banks are also monitored by the CBL. The law also 
contains articles that affect the accounting practices and financial reporting of the 
commercial banks. In Article 73, for example, a commercial bank must retain a capital 
reserve to which no less than 25% of net profit has to be transferred until it reaches 50% 
of the capital; afterwards 10% of the net profit is to be transferred each year to the reserve. 
                                                 
4 The accounting education system was primarily based on UK and US systems; therefore, it is logical that 
the accounting profession is influenced by both UK and US practices. Practitioners are the products of the 
education system as emphasised by Ahmed and Gao (2004) who suggest that the educational system is the 
first stage in the qualifying accountants process. 
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Every commercial bank has to appoint two external auditors for its financial year audit. 
These two auditors have to be registered5 with the Central Bank of Libya. 
In the Libyan Commercial banks context, the length of an auditor-bank relationship is 
restricted to only two years, which may help to ensure that a high audit quality is being 
conducted (of course there is a counter argument that auditors’ knowledge of the business 
is a positive function of tenure). If the previous auditor is to be reassigned, a cool-off period 
of at least one year has to pass. Firm rotation represents one of the most common 
mechanisms used to increase the auditor's independence which ceteris paribus may be 
expected to increase auditor willingness to challenge, and if necessary report on, earnings 
management (Libby et. al, 2015).  
3.	Theoretical	framework	and	research	questions	
Much of earnings management research, according to Habbash and Alghamdi (2015), is 
based on statistical methods and only a few studies have addressed the issue using a 
qualitative approach; they argue that such an approach can help to provide a critical 
understanding of the issue. Regulators, for instance, would benefit from the findings of 
such studies; they will "put an accurate interpretation on such findings" (Habbash and 
Alghamdi, 2015, p. 123). 
The findings of this paper are interpreted from an accountability perspective. The paper 
adopts a normative perspective whereby the findings are interpreted in terms of their 
relevance to the accountability mechanism. The objective role of accounting theory, 
according to Watts and Zimmerman (1978), is to “explain and predict accounting practice”. 
                                                 
5 Article 82 of the law requires the Central Bank of Libya to maintain a register of external auditors who are 
capable of auditing and inspecting banks’ accounts. 
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However, the role of accounting theory can, and in the view of this author should, be more 
concerned about how accounting practice can be improved. Accountability is arguably 
something that everyone should respect. Bovens (2007) asserts that accountability is a 
“gold” concept that is widely supported and that is widely used in political discourse since 
it implies transparency and trustworthiness. 
An accountability relationship implies that an accountor should provide an account to the 
accountee in order to discharge his/her accountability; the aim of such a relationship is to 
encourage the accountor to act in accordance with the accountee’s interests. 
Perks (1993) provides a number of elements for an accountability system to perform 
effectively: production of financial information; the audit of accounting information; and 
the publishing of accounting information. The operating commercial banks in Libya are 
required by commercial law as well as banking law to prepare and publish their financial 
statements. According to Article (226) of the Libyan Commercial Law, boards of directors 
of companies have to prepare financial statements including notes. They are also required 
to submit a report highlighting the company's activity during the period. Moreover, listed 
banks have to prepare their accounts according to International Financial Reporting 
Standards (Kribat, 2009). 
The second element of accountability (Perks, 1993) is the audit of accounting information. 
He believes that audited accounting information serves users better than unaudited 
information. The external audit function starts when the accounting process is completed; 
it represents the second stage in the process of holding accountable those responsible for 
the management of an organisation’s finances (White and Hollingsworth, 1999). The 
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literature suggests that the external audit process has become an important factor within 
the accountability system based on the nature of the audit process6. Moreover, it is argued 
that auditing activities are the direct result of the need for accountability: “accountability 
is the raison d’etre of auditing activities” (Gong, 2009, p. 5). He concluded that “audits are 
able to curtail the [misuse of power] by enhancing monitoring and supervision” (p. 6). 
Audit, according to White and Hollingsworth (1999), “provides professionally structured 
and independent information to a variety of actors in the accountability [process]” (p. 9). 
In this regard, Gong (2009), points out that a poor audit system “can leave the door open 
for irregular and illegal financial behaviors” (p. 6). In this context, Laffan (2003) suggests 
that financial accountability requires external auditing; she added that accountability is 
enhanced by the practice of audit in a professional manner as well as by reporting audit 
findings. 
Article (18) of the Libyan Commercial Law requires every company to appoint a licensed 
auditor to audit its accounts while Article (209) states that an auditor has to issue an 
auditor's report embodying his opinion on a company's accounting affairs; this report has 
to assert the auditor’s opinion as to whether a company's accounts are faithfully presented 
and comply with the law. The auditor's opinion also has to refer to whether accounts have 
been prepared according to the approved accounting standards7.  In terms of commercial 
banks, Banking Law No. 1 of 2005 requires that every bank’s accounts are certified by two 
                                                 
6 Some scholars, according to Gong (2009), argue that “auditing has strong anticorruption functions” due to 
the nature of audit work which puts the auditors in a position to uncover and deter potentially illegal or 
immoral behaviour.  
7 The law has not defined what approved accounting standards are. Financial reporting in Libya is largely 
influenced by the legal system; in particular the Libyan mercantile law, income tax law, and banking law 
for commercial banks, are considered to be the most important legal factors that have shaped  accounting 
practices in Libya (Shareia, 2014).. 
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external auditors. These auditors, according to Article 82 of the law, have to be included 
in a special register of those who are qualified and therefore authorized to audit banks.  
The third element identified by Perks (1993) is the publication of accounting information. 
For accountability to be discharged, accounting information has to be communicated to 
stakeholders. According to Laffan (2003), accountability is promoted by the publication of 
the information. As discussed above, the commercial law requires a company to prepare 
and publish its financial statements; Article (227) indicates the items which must be 
included in the balance sheet of a company. 
Although the above elements are basically required to ensure an effective accountability 
system, Perks (1993) acknowledges that in the real world accountability is often less than 
predicted. Therefore, a complete and effective accountability process cannot be assumed 
in Libya.  
Based on the above discussion, the auditor’s role within the accountability system should 
be clear; on one hand management has to provide financial information of good quality 
while the role of the external auditor is to provide assurance that the financial information 
is fair and true.  
For the purposes of this paper audit quality is defined as the ability of the auditor to detect 
and report on earnings management practices. It is acknowledged that this definition is 
somewhat restrictive but we would argue that it is consistent with the definition by 
DeAngelo.  It is also acknowledged that audit quality could be defined in a number of ways. 
It is, as mentioned earlier, a complex concept which could be differently perceived by 
different stakeholders. Different stakeholders have different views about what audit quality 
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refers to. Smith (2012) cited that stakeholders’ perceptions on audit quality will depend on 
their involvement level with the audit process. In the same context, Knechel et al. (2013, 
p. 386) stressed that stakeholders’ perceptions on audit quality are vary and largely 
dependent on “whose eyes one looks through” Users, for example, consider the absence of 
material misstatement as an indication for audit quality. Auditors, on the other hand, define 
audit quality as complying with all professional requirements. Similarly, regulators may 
perceive audit quality as being complying with both professional standards and legal 
requirements (Knechel et al., 2013). This paper seeks the perceptions of different 
stakeholders about audit quality, in particular, in relation to earnings management. 
And therefore the key focus of this paper is to examine the stakeholders’ perceptions as to 
whether the external auditor is able to provide good audit quality i.e. in being able to detect 
earnings management and potentially report on it. The paper also addresses stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the accountability of auditors themselves within the overall accountability 
of the LCBs, and their perceptions of the use made of auditors’ reports. Thus, the research 
questions can be formalized as follows: 
RQ1. How do LCBs' stakeholders perceive the efficiency of the external auditor in 
relation to earnings management?  
RQ2. How do LCBs’ stakeholders perceive the accountability of the external auditor? 
RQ3. How do LCBs’ stakeholders perceive the use of the external auditor’s report? 
4.	Research	method		
“… there has been a great deal of research into earnings management motivations 
using statistical methods8; however, few studies have offered a critical 
understanding of these problems through a survey such as interviews or 
questionnaires and understanding the nature and problems of earning management 
                                                 
8 See for example,  Corbella et al. (2015) employed two different measures of EM to test for audit quality 
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practices is crucial in order for regulators to put an accurate interpretation on such 
findings” (Habbash and Alghamdi, 2015, p. 123). 
 
This paper adopts a qualitative approach by examining the perceptions of LCBs' 
stakeholders regarding the role of the external auditor in relation to earnings management. 
It is hoped that this approach can help to address the identified lack of qualitative research 
on earnings management relative to that which has been quantitative in nature. The paper 
also seeks to provide insightful information for various stakeholders, in addition to the 
regulators mentioned by Habbash and Alghamdi (2015). 
Consistent with Habbash and Alghamdi (2015) who use both questionnaire and semi-
structured interviews to address earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia, this paper 
benefited from combining the two methods to explore the role of the external auditor in 
relation to the practice of earnings management by LCBs.  
In the first stage, 28 semi-structured interviews were conducted through which 
stakeholders’ views were sought about the external auditor’s ability to detect and prevent 
earnings management practices. The interviewees were selected on the basis that they 
possessed the knowledge and the experience to contribute to the research. Interviewees 
have been divided into four groups, namely: Preparers (PR); Auditors (AD); Regulators 
(RG); and Users (US). Some interviewees hold more than one position; for example, PR5 
is a bank chairman, external auditor and academic. 
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Table 1: Interviewee Groups 
Group Position Qualification Location 
Preparers 
PR1 Chairman  Msc Commercial bank 
PR2 Head of Correspondent Banking Office Msc Commercial bank 
PR3 Member of BoD  PhD Commercial bank 
PR4 Head of Accounting Dept. BSc Commercial bank 
PR5 Chairman  PhD Commercial bank 
PR6 Head of Accounts Preparing Dept. BSc Commercial bank 
PR7 Head of Accounts Preparing Dept. BSc Commercial bank 
PR8 Head of Correspondent Banking  BSc Commercial bank 
PR9 Vice Manager of Eastern Branches Management 
Primary 
School 
Commercial bank 
PR10 Head of Finance and Control Msc Commercial bank 
PR11 Head of Financial Management BSc Commercial bank 
PR12 Assistant Manager of Accounting Dept. Diploma Commercial bank 
Auditors 
AD1 Auditor BSc Audit firm 
AD2 Auditor Msc Audit firm 
AD3 Senior Partner  PhD Audit firm 
AD4 Managing Partner BSc Audit firm 
Regulators 
RG1 Chief of Benghazi Branch  Msc LAAA 
RG2 Inspector of commercial banks BSc CBL 
RG3 Inspector of commercial banks Msc CBL 
RG4 Banking Exchange Control Dept. BSc CBL 
RG5 Governor Deputy of CBL (Benghazi branch) Msc CBL 
RG6 Vice General Manager BSc Tax Authority 
RG7 Head of Listing and Follow-up Dept. BSc LSM 
RG8 Head of Internal Audit BSc LSM 
RG9 Manager of Surveillance & Follow-up Risks Dept. Msc LSM 
RG10 Legal Consultant BSc Commercial bank 
Users US1 Lecturer PhD Benghazi Uni. US2 Lecturer PhD Benghazi Uni. 
Key:  PR= Preparer, RG= Regulator, AD= Auditor, US= Users. BoD= Board of Directors, LAAA= the 
Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association, CBL= Central Bank of Libya, and LSM= Libyan Stock 
Market. 
The second research method used was a questionnaire survey. This was undertaken in the 
period early January 2013 till February 2013 during which time 193 copies were given to 
various stakeholders of the Libyan Commercial Banks.  
Table 2 summarizes the number of returned questionnaires categorized by different 
stakeholders. 
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Table 2: The Returned Questionnaires 
Respondent Groups Returned Questionnaires Response Rate 
Preparers 27 48% 
Auditors  27 50% 
Regulators 20 64% 
Users  28 54% 
Total 102 53% 
 
The total proportions of each individual group (Preparers, Auditors, Regulators, and Users) 
are 26.5%, 26.5%, 19.6%, and 27.5% respectively; most are male (90 out of 102 or 88.2%). 
Twenty eight (27.5%) are professionally qualified, mainly being members of the Libyan 
Accountants and Auditors Association (LAAA) (24 or 23.5%). Ninety (88.2%) of the 
respondents have an academic qualification higher than a Diploma which suggests a good 
basic knowledge of financial issues. Most importantly, 78 (76.5%) of the respondents have 
indicated that they have banking experience which again gives a reasonable level of 
assurance as regards obtaining informed views about Libyan commercial banks  (LCBs). 
Once the responses were coded into an Excel spreadsheet, the data was transferred to the 
SPSS statistical package for analysis. This study focuses on different stakeholders’ 
perceptions regarding the role of the external auditor in relation to earnings management 
practices in Libyan Commercial Banks; for this purpose, most questions were designed 
based on a five-point Likert scale.   
Therefore, non-parametric tests were employed in this study, in particular the Kruskal-
Wallis (KW) and Mann-Whitney (MW) tests. The KW test is used to identify whether any 
significant difference exists among the perceptions of the groups; if so, a MW test is carried 
out to determine which pairs of groups show significantly different perceptions. For further 
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illustration, descriptive statistics, means and standard deviations9, were also calculated to 
provide more insightful pictures of the perceptions. 
As previously reported, the majority of the questions were based on 5-point Likert scales 
ranging from (1) strongly disagree (SD) to (5) strongly agree (SA). The findings discussion 
will be restricted only to those which have p-values of 0.05 or under. 
5.	Research	findings		
5.1 Interview Findings about the Role of the External Auditor 
Initially interviewees were asked whether, and to what extent, they thought that the auditor 
is able to detect and prevent managers from being involved in earnings management. 25 
(89%) of interviewees believe that the external auditor has the ability to detect the practice 
of earnings management, but only 7  (25%) think that the external audit does deter it. 
All Preparers are in agreement about the external auditor’s ability to detect earnings 
management but their views in respect of whether the external auditor can deter the practice 
of earnings management showed almost equal results; 5 of them believe that the external 
auditor can deter it while 6 Preparers hold the opposite view that they cannot deter it. All 
Auditors who have answered this question said that the external auditor can detect the 
practices of earnings management but will be unable to deter it. The majority of Regulators 
(9 out of 10) think that the external auditor can detect earnings management practices but 
only 2 (out 9 who believe he/she can detect) think that the external auditor can deter 
                                                 
9 Means and standard deviations are, strictly speaking, not appropriate as measures of ordinal data, but their 
use is widespread and they arguably have reasonable information content subject to assumptions made about 
the intervals in the ordinal data. 
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earnings management. The only User who answered this question gave the view that the 
external auditor is able to detect earnings management but is unable to deter it. 
PR1, for instance, suggested that the auditor is able to prevent through his opinion and can 
detect the earnings management practices. On the other hand, the ability to prevent such a 
practice apparently is affected by a number of factors as will be discussed later. The 
majority of interviewees (89%) agreed that the external auditor can detect earnings 
management if he/she is qualified. As for preventing earnings management, responses 
come in different ways. Some say that he can prevent it through ‘waving’10 his/her report 
and some say that he cannot prevent it for some reasons. PR4, for example, mentioned the 
fees amount that an auditor may lose in case of any conflict with management. He said: 
"The auditor is supposed to be qualified to detect it through the process of 
audit. It depends on his personality if he is not caring about the money he 
would say “no”. But actually most of them say ok. Our fees have reached 
50,000 LD". 
External auditor efficiency, which is a central issue within the accountability mechanism, 
is seen to be compromised by the high audit fees commercial banks usually pay and also 
the personality of the individual external auditor.  Ironically, the external audit represents 
a very important element in the accountability process which theoretically should be 
enhanced by the payment of high fees to reflect rigorous and high quality audits. Those 
high fees themselves could, however, harm accountability due to the threat of financial 
dependence. 
Also, interviewees perceived that an auditors' experience plays a significant role in 
detecting earnings management practices. In the first year of an audit, auditors may not be 
                                                 
10 Threatening that he/she may issue a qualified opinion. 
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experienced enough in relation to understanding the new client’s business to detect 
earnings management as expressed by PR5 and PR12 who respectively said: 
"It depends on what is the experience of the auditor in terms of time; an 
auditor for one year could not, but an auditor who has being auditing for five 
years for instance could detect and can give some advice on how to reduce 
the practice". 
"External auditor in his first time of auditing will not be able to detect it. But 
if he discovered he can prevent it". 
The notion of audit tenure11 was also mentioned in the response of PR10 who also blamed 
limited audit samples for not uncovering earnings management practices. 
"To some extent, the external auditor can detect earnings management, but 
only to some extent as he will take samples. He will not be able to audit all 
transactions. When he detects the earnings management, it is supposed that 
he has the power to prevent it. Due to the limited number of auditors who are 
qualified to audit big institutions, the more the auditor becomes familiar with 
the institution the more the auditor creates a kind of relation with the 
institution that makes the auditor work for the management instead of 
shareholders". 
The audit process itself could be seen, as in above quotation, as one of the factors that could 
affect the detection of earnings management practices. This was also stressed by US1, who 
considered the problem of audit samples by saying: 
"Yes, the auditor can discover it. But not all earnings management practices 
because of audit samples. The auditor is one of the tools to discover earnings 
management practices. The auditor needs standards, and professional 
management in order to be able to discover, also has to be qualified. This is a 
big question that cannot be answered easily; auditor has to be protected when 
appointed and when terminated. He has to have standards to be applied". 
Auditor independence represents a core element in the audit function and thus in the 
accountability process. AD1 described the relation between auditors and management by 
saying: 
                                                 
11 According to the CBL’s regulation, an auditor can only be assigned for maximum two years for the same 
bank. However, the appointment may be renewed after a one year audit by another auditor.  
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"Auditor assignment is 90% or 99% dependent on personal contacts so an 
auditor’s decision is consistent with the management's desire”.  
In the same vein, RG1, when asked to rate the efficiency of listed auditors, mentioned the 
problem of personal contacts in appointing the external auditor. He said: 
"Not all of them are at the same level of efficiency. Some audit assignments 
are based on personal contacts and are regardless of the effectiveness or 
efficiency". 
The accountability process can be seen as less effective once an auditor’s independence is 
compromised; therefore more efforts have to be taken in order to enhance auditor 
independence. 
AD3 commented: 
"If he was capable he would detect it. The profession is suffering. In Libya 
there is a problem unfortunately; industry got a lot of unqualified auditors 
meanwhile a lot of qualified people as well. The market and life 
circumstances play a role in making auditors give up (no resistance) to the 
management. I know and you know there are some auditors who only have 
one client and he is not braced for losing it". 
The profession itself could contribute to an auditor’s ability to detect and prevent earnings 
management practices. For example, PR3 has said: 
"Most external auditors don’t prevent the practice of earnings management. 
The audit function is traditional in Libya". 
This suggests that the improvement of the entire profession (which arguably could start 
with the setting of accounting standards) is needed in order to back accounting practices 
and therefore facilitate the audit function. In other words, the conceptual framework would 
empower the accountability process. 
PR10 also commented on this issue in assessing the listed auditors’ efficiency by saying: 
"They have the experience in banks audit. They have the ability. But they are 
a bit traditional, they are not following the technology". 
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Earnings management itself could be the reason why auditors cannot detect or prevent it. 
RG8 commented: 
"Well it is a new topic and most auditors have no idea about it so I think they 
cannot detect if. On the other hand, the independence of the auditor is all the 
time questionable". 
The external auditor plays a crucial role in the accountability relationship; his/her role is to 
give assurance and confidence that financial statements faithfully represent the financial 
situation of the firm. This role may be impaired by some factors, as interview findings 
reveal a view that the external auditor’s effectiveness may be affected by knowledge, 
experience, conflict of interest (fees, tenure) and audit procedures and sampling. Therefore, 
and based on interview findings, the external auditor’s effectiveness is questionable and 
therefore accountability would be judged as being breached. Moreover, the interview 
findings reported earlier suggests that 89% of interviewees acknowledge the ability of the 
external auditor in detecting earnings management practices, but only 25% of interviewees 
believe that the external auditor is able to play a role in deterring LCBs managers from 
being engaged in earnings management. This suggests that accountability is to some extent 
affected by the personality of the external auditor that was suggested by PR4 when he was 
speaking about the high fees for bank audits. 
Interviewees' views about the ability and efficiency of auditors who are listed at the CBL 
and thereby authorised to audit banks were also explored. Some interviewees accept that 
most of those listed auditors have the capability to audit banks while others were more 
sceptical. 
PR1 has stated: 
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"It is a very good question. Only those who have audited banks and got the 
experience. Not all of them are qualified to audit banks". 
This might lead to the question of what standards does the CBL follow in listing external 
auditors. PR3 raised this query: 
"The auditors who are listed and authorised to audit banks, I am not convinced 
about them, because there are no standards to accept the auditor and licence 
him to audit banks".  
Interviewees were also asked to determine the extent to which the auditor's report is used 
by various stakeholders. Libyan stakeholders may lack the culture and tradition of reading 
the reports as declared by RG1 who said: 
"Some ways of manipulation are easy to detect but giving a qualified opinion 
is not enough because of inaccuracy of the auditor’s report on one hand. On 
the hand there is no report reading culture by interested parties... the use of 
the auditor report is very limited and in most cases is informal". 
RG5 thinks that the auditor’s report is only a legal requirement and that no one is using it. 
He said: 
"There is no relying on it at all. It is only a legal requirement". 
RG9 also suggested: 
"Unfortunately it is a legal requirement by the LSM and I don’t think people 
are interested in it". 
Interviewees view the CBL, LSM, tax authorities and management as the stakeholders who 
are most interested in the auditor's report. PR1 added correspondent banks as another party 
which is interested in the external auditor's report. He also commented on investors' use of 
the auditor's report. He said it was: 
"Supposed to be very important for the CBL and the LSM and correspondents 
are very interested in the auditor's report. Investors are not, as they depend on 
their broker when deciding on buying or selling shares". 
According to, PR4, no one is using the auditor’s report. He noticed: 
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"Supposed to depend on it, but I don’t think they do use it here". 
The auditor’s reputation may be an important factor in a report’s use. PR11 stressed the 
good reputation of the auditor. He stated: 
"The owners are much more interested in the detailed report12 rather than an 
opinion report. Also the auditor himself plays an important role for example 
a report signed by one auditor, for example, will be accepted by the tax 
authority with no suspicion, on the other hand another auditor's report could 
be thrown away". 
For AD4 only foreign companies are interested in the auditor's report while the local 
authorities only ask for it as a legal requirement. He observed: 
"Frankly no one uses it [the auditor’s report] except the foreign companies 
who send it to their head offices in order to make the consolidated statements. 
In Libya they use it as a legal requirement only. One time in a general 
assembly meeting the auditor was not invited to read his report". 
As understood, the main functions of the external auditor are to examine the financial 
statements and to provide an opinion based on that examination. In other words, the 
external auditor’s role within the accountability system is fulfilled when the external 
auditor’s report is issued. In the case that this report is not being used, the accountability 
system may not be fully implemented. It could also reflect lack of awareness by various 
stakeholders about the accountability system in general and the role of the external auditor 
in the accountability process in particular. 
                                                 
12 There are, in Libya, two reports an auditor has to submit to the general assembly; a detailed report which 
normally consists of auditor’s remarks on the internal control system and any mistaken transactions, the other 
is the opinion report. 
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5.2 Questionnaire Results about the relationship between Earnings Management 
and the External Auditor 
5.2.1	Perceptions	about	the	Effectiveness	of	the	External	Auditor		
As mentioned earlier, only specifically listed auditors are permitted to conduct an audit of 
banks. This requirement would imply that listed auditors are of high qualifications and 
experience, and thereby are effective and able to prevent or at least deter bank managers 
from being involved in earnings management practices. Stakeholders were asked to assess 
the capability of listed auditors for auditing banks and how able they are to deter and 
prevent earnings management. The use of the auditor’s report in helping interested parties 
assess the bank’s financial performance was also examined. In addition, a question 
addressed views as to whether the auditor’s reporting is being used by the auditor to deter 
or prevent the practice of earnings management. The results are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about External Auditors Efficiency (K-W test) 
Q Statement N Mean SD Group Means K-W P-value PR AD RG US 
1 Listed auditors, in practice, are well qualified and capable to audit banks 102 3.18 1.066 3.30 3.11 3.20 3.11 .860 
2 
The auditor’s report is relied upon when 
assessing a bank’s financial 
performance 
102 3.69 .844 3.85 3.37 3.65 3.86 .074 
3 
Listed auditors are likely to detect and 
deter earnings management practices in 
LCBs 
102 3.37 .943 3.52 3.26 3.55 3.21 .523 
4 
An auditor’s ability to report on 
earnings management is compromised 
by audit fees 
102 2.98 .975 2.96 2.70 3.00 3.25 .253 
5 
An auditor’s willingness to report 
earnings management breaches is 
compromised by conflict of interest to 
an auditor’s independence 
102 3.09 .902 2.96 3.07 3.00 3.29 .519 
6 
The external auditor can prevent the 
practice of earnings management using 
the power of the auditor’s report 
99 3.53 .849 3.81 3.12 3.58 3.61 .025* 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
the external auditor’s efficiency. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-
Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for 
each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
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As shown in Table 3, the mean scores indicate that stakeholders groups agreed to most of 
the questions. Listed auditors, according to stakeholders groups, were viewed as qualified 
and capable of performing banks’ audits with an average mean of 3.18. It is worth noting 
that some of the interview findings suggested that at least not all of the listed auditors are 
perceived as well qualified and able to audit banks due to experience discrepancies among 
listed auditors as per, for example, PR5: 
“It depends on what is the experience of the auditor in terms of time; an 
auditor for one year could not, but an auditor who has being auditing for five 
year for instance could detect and can give some advice on how to reduce the 
practice”. 
The stakeholder groups agreed, on balance, also that the auditor’s report is being used to 
help assess the financial performance of banks which again is unexpected and is in conflict 
with some of the interview findings that suggest auditors’ reports are only a legal 
requirement and nearly ignored in the decision making process.  
In keeping with the first finding in this table, stakeholders agreed on balance that listed 
auditors are able to detect and deter earnings management practices by LCBs which may 
indicate that this ability is not compromised by any factor i.e. audit fees. However, 
stakeholder groups disagreed, on balance, that audit fees affect the auditor’s ability to 
report on earnings management, the overall mean score is 2.92. This result is in contrast to 
some views expressed in the interviews; for example, one of the interview findings offered 
by PR4 suggests that bank audit fees may affect the external auditor’s ability to report about 
earnings management practices by LCBs. 
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The relative disagreement regarding audit fees’ impact on an auditor’s ability to report on 
earnings management could be partially due to the fact that the Auditors group tends, more 
than others, to disagree with this statement by giving the least mean score of 2.70. Given 
the questionnaire responses reported by Auditors only, it is clear the general attitude of 
Auditors tends to the disagreement side. The Auditors have shown 4 strongly disagree 
individual responses, the most compared to other groups, and 7 disagreements. However, 
due to the sensitivity of such a question, this may be influenced by their desire to appear 
not compromised by audit fees. Preparers’ responses are spread equally; 10, on the side of 
disagreement, including 2 strongly disagrees, and 10 on the side of agreement, including 1 
strongly agree. 
Stakeholder groups have shown, on balance, a perception that an auditor’s willingness to 
report about earnings management is affected by conflict of interest and thereby auditor’s 
independence is compromised. In other words, there are some perceptions that reporting 
about earnings management breaches may lead to termination of an appointment which 
would affect the auditor decision, and thus his/her independence is compromised. The last 
question asked about the external auditor’s ability to prevent earnings management 
practices just by the power of the audit report. In other words, if bank managers did not 
adjust the reported income to undo the earnings management practices according to the 
external auditor’s notes, a qualified opinion will be given by the auditor. Stakeholder 
groups agreed, on balance, the effective power of the auditor’s report. Needless to say no 
single client would be happy to receive a qualified report. 
The perceptions of questionnaire respondents are broadly in line those of the interviews as 
reported in Section 5.1 regarding the ability of the external auditor in detecting the earnings 
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management. On balance, there is agreement by questionnaire respondents’ regarding the 
ability of the external auditor to both detect and deter earnings management practices. The 
mean score for this question was 3.37 (Q 3). In a more specific question regarding the 
ability of the external auditor to prevent earnings management practices (Q 6), respondents, 
on average, apparently agree that the external auditor is able to deter such behaviour, 
moreover this can be achieved through the power of the external auditor’s report. However, 
the interview findings reported earlier refer to a contradictory view which is that the 
external auditor is able to detect the practice of earnings management, but, as for deterring 
this practice, only 25% of interviewees think that the external auditor is able to do that. 
It has previously been found, see, for example, Smith (2012) and Knechel et al. (2013), 
that different stakeholders can have different views on audit quality. Consistent with such 
findings, the results reported in Table 3, while showing wide agreement between 
stakeholder groups, show that Users are more doubtful of the ability of auditors to report 
on EM due to audit fees as well as a perceived conflict of interest. It is also worth noting 
that the Auditors group showed less confidence, for example when compared to the Users 
group, about audit quality. Notwithstanding the reservations apparently held by users 
regarding audit fees and conflicts of interest, the results show that, in general, regulators 
and preparers, as well as users in some cases, have more confidence in the effectiveness of 
the audit function than do auditors themselves.   It could be that the mandated requirements 
of the Central Bank of Libya for listed auditors could have a bearing on stakeholders’ 
perceptions. This may contribute to a view that listed auditors are well qualified and 
positioned in a way that enables them to provide high audit quality. On the other hand, the 
more modest views of auditors themselves about their effectiveness could potentially refer 
29 
 
to the challenges and difficulties experienced by auditors of which other stakeholders are 
less aware. 
The results articulated in Table 3 reveal only one significant difference; therefore, a Mann-
Whitney test was implemented to identify which pairs have conflicting views. The results 
of these tests are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about External Auditors Efficiency:  M-W test 
Q Statement K-W P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
1 Listed auditors, in practice, are well qualified and capable to audit banks .860 .481 .714 .533 .564 .905 .798 
2 
The auditor’s report is relied upon 
when assessing a bank’s financial 
performance 
.074 .032* .262 .972 .265 .037* .290 
3 
Listed auditors are likely to detect 
and deter earnings management 
practices in LCBs 
.523 .305 .987 .268 .374 .816 .280 
4 
An auditor’s ability to detect 
earnings management is 
compromised by audit fees 
.253 .386 1.000 .335 .278 .057 .249 
5 
An auditor’s willingness to report 
earnings management breaches is 
compromised by conflict of interest 
to an auditor’s independence 
.519 .554 .836 .213 .553 .488 .209 
6 
The external auditor can prevent the 
practice of earnings management 
using the power of the auditor’s 
report 
.025* .005* .246 .420 .054 .042* .783 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about the external auditor’s efficiency. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), 
and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
Although one significant difference resulted from the KW test, four significant differences 
appeared when the MW tests were performed. The first resulted between the Preparers and 
Auditors groups regarding the use of the external auditor’s report, it can be seen from Table 
4 that both groups agreed to reliance being placed on the auditor’s report in the financial 
decision making process. Also, Preparers and Users groups seemingly have a conflict of 
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views in this respect as the MW test results in a significant difference between them (.037). 
The Preparers and Auditors again show a significant difference in connection with the 
influence of the external auditor’s report in preventing earnings management practices, and 
there was also a significant difference between Preparers and Users regarding the same 
question. However, all groups’ means reveal an aggregate level of agreement with the last 
question. 
The implications of the results reported above in Tables 3 and 4 on the accountability 
process stem basically from the importance of the role of the external auditor within the 
accountability process. This role relies mainly on the qualification and independence of the 
external auditor. If these qualities are in question then so will be the external audit 
efficiency resulting in impaired accountability of LCBs. The next section discusses, in 
addition to the use of the external auditor’s report, whether the external auditor is aware of 
his/her accountability towards stakeholders other than shareholders. 
5.2.2	Perceptions	about	External	Auditor	Accountability	
This section examined perceptions of different stakeholders concerning the external 
auditor’s awareness of his/her own accountability. Respondents were asked to indicate 
their agreement or disagreement as to whether external auditors are aware of their 
responsibility towards shareholders and other parties who may make a decision based on 
the external auditor’s report. The section also surveyed perceptions of the use of the 
external auditor’s report by stakeholders. Finally, the section also examined one of the 
points made by an interviewee that the external auditor’s report is only a legal requirement 
and that it is not used in the financial decision making process. The results are presented in 
Table 5. 
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Table 5: The External Auditor’s Accountability and the Extent to Which His/Her 
Report is used: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD Group Means K-W P-value PR AD RG US 
1 External auditors are fully aware of their accountability to the shareholders 98 3.46 1.047 3.64 3.64 3.80 3.07 .074 
2 External auditors are fully aware of their accountability to the third parties 97 3.33 .898 3.56 3.56 3.47 3.04 .128 
3 The auditor’s report is widely used by interested stakeholders 98 3.46 .864 3.80 3.80 3.65 3.14 .040* 
4 
The auditor’s report is only a legal 
requirement and not used widely in the 
financial decision making process 
98 2.85 1.068 2.52 2.52 2.70 3.00 .223 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
the auditor’s accountability and his report extent. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value 
for the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), 
and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
Table 5 shows the overall mean responses for these questions. The average responses 
indicate that, overall, stakeholders groups agree that the external auditor is mindful of 
his/her responsibility and accountability not only to shareholders but beyond; the results 
also reveal that external auditors are aware of their accountability to third parties. The 
average means were 3.46 and 3.33 respectively. Stakeholder groups also agreed that the 
auditor’s report is widely used by interested stakeholders in the decision making process 
with a mean score of 3.46, and, unexpectedly, refuted the notion that the auditor’s report is 
only a legal requirement and not widely used in financial decision making. This result is at 
variance with the interview findings reported earlier as some interviewees indicated that 
the external auditor’s report is not widely used. RG5, for example, stated that “There is no 
relying on it [the auditor’s report] at all. It is only a legal requirement”.  
The K-W test points out a significant difference amongst the groups regarding the use of 
the external auditor’s report by interested stakeholders. To identify which pairs have 
significantly differing viewpoints, M-W test was performed and the results are shown in 
Table 6. 
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Table 6: The External Auditor’s Accountability and the Extent to Which His/Her 
Report is used: M-W test 
Q Statement K-W P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
1 
External auditors are fully aware of 
their accountability to the 
shareholders 
.074 .496 .549 .040* .243 .215 .024* 
2 
External auditors are fully aware of 
their accountability to the third 
parties 
.128 .290 .562 .027* .665 .228 .113 
3 The auditor’s report is widely used by interested stakeholders .040* .043* .627 .012* .209 .507 .085 
4 
The auditor’s report is only a legal 
requirement and not used widely in 
the financial decision making process 
.223 .052 .550 .172 .191 .734 .437 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about the auditor’s accountability and his report extent. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), 
regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
The results shown in Table 6 show a number of significant differences. Preparers and Users 
groups have shown different views regarding the auditors’ awareness of their 
accountability towards shareholders; although both agreed with the statement on balance 
as their mean scores in Table 5 indicate (although the Users group’s agreement is only 
slightly above the mid-point being 3.07). Regulators and Users have also shown a 
disagreement regarding this question. The second statement has a significant difference 
between Preparers and Users, who have generated mean scores of 3.56 and 3.04 
respectively, it is notable that the Preparers’ mean is the highest while the Users is the 
lowest. 
Although Preparer and Auditor groups generated the same mean score of 3.80 regarding 
the use of the auditor’s report by stakeholders, M-W results reveal a significant difference 
between these two groups towards this statement. The M-W results also show a significant 
difference for this statement between preparers and users groups whose mean scores are 
3.80 and 3.41 respectively.  
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5.2.3	Perceptions	about	the	Use	of	the	External	Auditor’s	Report	by	Various	
Stakeholders	
The use of the auditor’s report has been discussed earlier; this section reports, in particular, 
which stakeholders are perceived to be using the external auditor’s report. Respondents 
were asked to assess the use of the external auditor’s report by a certain list of stakeholders. 
The listed stakeholders have been partially mentioned in the interviews, others are drawn 
from the literature. However, the results shown in Tables 7 and 8 reveal no significant 
differences and the respondent groups all agreed (on aggregate) and with different levels, 
that the auditor’s report is being used by these stakeholders.  
Table 7: The External Auditor’s Report Use by Various Stakeholders: K-W Test 
Q Statement N Mean SD Group Means K-W P-value PR AD RG US 
1 Shareholders 99 3.88 .848 4.04 3.72 3.90 3.86 .487 
2 Management 99 3.70 .963 3.85 3.40 3.95 3.64 .304 
3 Employees 98 3.22 .914 3.36 3.08 3.45 3.07 .475 
4 Tax authority 98 3.76 .909 3.96 3.58 3.80 3.68 .531 
5 Current and potential customers 96 3.49 .962 3.58 3.52 3.47 3.39 .864 
6 The Libyan Stock Market  98 4.02 .786 3.92 3.88 4.10 4.18 .309 
7 Central Bank of Libya 99 4.09 .771 4.15 3.96 4.00 4.21 .376 
8 Corresponding banks 96 3.64 .964 3.58 3.60 3.75 3.63 .989 
9 Media 97 3.27 1.005 3.25 3.28 3.45 3.14 .825 
10 Academia and research centres 98 3.43 .952 3.48 3.44 3.70 3.18 .359 
11 Society as a whole 97 3.24 .966 3.42 3.24 3.40 2.96 .411 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
who use the auditor’s report. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis 
(K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for each 
question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
As the results in Table 7 suggest, no significant differences appeared from the K-W test. 
This is also supported by the mean scores all being above 3 which  indicates, unexpectedly, 
a view that all listed stakeholders, on balance, and on aggregate, are using the external 
auditor’s report. However, The Central Bank of Libya and the Libyan Stock Market are the 
users for whom there is strongest agreement that they use the external auditor’s report with 
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mean scores of 4.09 and 4.02 respectively. On the other hand, Employees have been 
indicated as users of the external auditor’s report with the lowest mean score of 3.22. 
Table 8: The External Auditor’s Report Use by Various Stakeholders: M-W test 
Q Statement K-W P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
1 Shareholders .487 .148 .546 .460 .430 .416 1.000 
2 Management .304 .118 .704 .675 .076 .345 .445 
3 Employees .475 .336 .860 .305 .250 .895 .217 
4 Tax authority .531 .103 .438 .551 .479 .563 .893 
5 Current and potential customers .864 .537 .405 .566 .721 .841 1.000 
6 The Libyan Stock Market  .309 .630 .685 .225 .356 .101 .398 
7 Central Bank of Libya .376 .328 .570 .413 .815 .137 .259 
8 Corresponding banks .989 .709 .949 .996 .789 .875 .773 
9 Media .825 .936 .604 .681 .560 .644 .395 
10 Academia and research centres .359 .809 .374 .302 .287 .390 .119 
11 Society as a whole .411 .484 .999 .155 .568 .359 .205 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about who use the auditor’s report. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), 
and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
The results in Table 8 point out no significant differences between any two groups in 
respect of the using of the auditor’s report by the various stakeholders. These results 
indicate, on balance, wide use of the external auditor’s report by shareholders and other 
stakeholders. 
6.	Summary	and	Conclusion		
The external auditor represents a key element in the accountability mechanism. Their 
important role, providing assurance and improving the credibility of the financial 
statements, increases public confidence in respect of the reliability and relevance of the 
provided financial information i.e. by providing an audit of good quality. It arguably can 
be said that a good quality audit would reduce or prevent earnings management practices 
thus helping to provide financial information which would be of good quality and 
ultimately one can argue good audit quality has a crucial role in promoting the 
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accountability system. As mentioned earlier, only registered auditors with the CBL are 
authorised to perform the audit of banks which implies a certain level of audit quality is 
required by the CBL. Based on this one could have a reasonable expectation that good 
quality audits are  being carried out in LCBs and therefore LCBs’ financial reporting is of 
a reasonable level of quality i.e. unbiased accounting information is being provided. 
Interviewees were asked to assess the role of the external auditor in respect of earnings 
management by LCBs’ managers. Although they expressed the view that registered 
auditors are able to detect earnings management practices of LCBs, they were doubtful, for 
various reasons about the ability of the external auditor when it comes to preventing or 
deterring the practices. 89% of interviewees had the view that the auditor is able to detect 
earnings management but 75% of them thought that the auditor is unable to prevent such a 
practice. Some other issues were referred to as reducing the external auditor’s ability to 
detect or prevent earnings management, these were: lack of knowledge, limited experience, 
conflict of interest, and audit sampling. The accountability then can be perceived as being 
compromised given the perceived inability of the external auditor to both detect and 
prevent earnings management and as a consequence the audit function is being provided at 
a low level of quality. 
Based on such a finding one can argue that LCBs’ stakeholders have reduced trust13 in the 
auditing profession. It could also be inferred that LCBs’ are basing their decisions on other 
sources rather than audited financial statements. This would be in line with Malsch and 
Gendron (2009) who found that investment decisions are being taken based on the quality 
                                                 
13 Trust can broadly be defined as “a mechanism that can reduce uncertainty in context of interaction and 
facilitate the functioning of organizational systems” (Malsch and Gendron, 2009, p. 739). 
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of management rather than the content of financial statements.  Financial analysts may be 
thought to behave as though they rely on auditors and depend on audit quality as being 
crucial to their daily business. However this collective imagery may not reflect the reality. 
According to Malsch and Gendron (2009), the assessment of management integrity and 
competencies is a more important basis on which investment decisions are made. 
The role of the external auditor was examined in more detail by the questionnaire survey. 
The external audit function is related to the accounting standards as it is part of the auditor’s 
job to ensure financial statements have been prepared in accordance with the adopted 
framework i.e. accounting standards. Previous literature reports that the lack of accounting 
standards in Libya would make such a mission a challenging task in many aspects: lack of 
a framework leads to financial information being unstable, the accounting practices applied 
in one year may not be applied in the next period or it may happen that two banks apply 
different practices. In addition, the verifiability characteristic would not be an easy task, 
absence of accounting standards could lead to different outcomes if financial information 
were to be produced by another accountant. The lack of accounting standards may also 
open the door for managers to apply any accounting practice that serves their own benefit 
and present the financial statements in a favourable position to their stakeholders. To sum 
up, it could be argued that deficient, or lack of, standards leads to a deficient audit function. 
The questionnaire results showed, on balance, agreement by LCBs’ stakeholders that the 
ineffective function of the external audit, as well as the difficulty of detecting earnings 
management by auditors may be reasons why earnings management is taking place in 
LCBs’ financial reporting.  
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Another result revealed stakeholders’ agreement that educating the external auditor may 
have a positive impact on the external auditor’s ability to deter earnings management 
behaviour. This result led to the inference that listed auditors are not trained and educated 
well enough to detect the behaviour. Moreover, the questionnaire results reveal that listed 
auditors are relatively (on balance) in a good position that enables them to detect and deter 
earnings management practices of LCBs’ managers. This finding is consistent with a 
number of findings in the literature which give support to audit specialization. e.g Krishnan 
(2003), Dunn and Mayhew (2004), Lowensohn et al. (2007), and Bruynseels et al., (2011) 
who concluded that specialized auditors are more likely to detect errors in financial 
statements than non-specialist auditors. Similarly, our findings are consistent with, for 
example, Kramer et al. (2011) and Kim et al. (2015) regarding the positive effect of audit 
firm rotation on audit quality. Also, the paper has provided evidence that audit quality may 
be perceived differently by different stakeholders as found by, for example, Smith (2012) 
and Knechel et al. (2013).The sanction through which auditors are able to deter earnings 
management practices, according to the questionnaire results, is the auditor’s report. In this 
context another difference arose between the interview findings and the questionnaire 
results. Interviewees had the view that listed auditors are unable to deter earnings 
management practices referring to some issues to support this notion, e.g. audit fees and 
the lack of significance of the external auditor report since in some cases it is only regarded 
as a nominal legal requirement. On the other hand, questionnaire respondents agreed that 
the auditor’s report does deter the practice implying a more effective accountability 
process, through higher audit quality. 
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Other issues were explored in the questionnaire regarding perceptions of the external 
auditor. LCBs’ stakeholders showed, on balance, agreement that the external auditor is 
aware of his/her accountability to shareholders and other parties and also that the auditor’s 
report is not only a legal requirement but is being widely used by various stakeholders 
contrary to most of the views expressed in the interviews. Specifically, the questionnaire 
results showed, on average, agreement that the auditor’s report is being used by: 
shareholders, management, employees, the tax authority, customers, the Libyan Stock 
Market, the CBL, corresponding banks, the media, academia, and society as a whole. 
Although the questionnaire results in many aspects show support for the current status of 
the bank audit function, in contrast to the interview findings, LCBs’ stakeholders did 
perceive a weakness in the regulatory regime.  They agreed, on balance, to the need to 
strengthen both audit regulation and oversight of financial reporting. This could be seen to 
imply that the accountability of LCBs does require additional tools in order to be enhanced. 
The institutional context of bank audits in Libya is regulated by more than statutory 
legislation, it includes, for example, the CBL’s requirements for bank auditors’ 
qualifications and experience.  However, this may not be sufficient to provide good audit 
quality and therefore more measures may be required. This suggests that, to enhance the 
accountability process of LCBs, efforts should be made to enhance the audit function by 
strengthening it through legislation. Also, oversight of the financial reporting function, 
which does not exist at the moment, should be established so that the accountability system 
can be further enhanced. Literature findings on the weaknesses of the accounting 
profession in Libya can point to potential reasons for such an audit quality level. Further 
research can help to identity how the accounting profession in Libya can be improved. And 
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as a result the accountability process could be strengthened not only within the banking 
industry, but in the wider economy. Gray et al. (2015) have highlighted the close 
relationship between audit and accountability and it seems clear that without a trusted audit 
function there will be a serious lack of accountability in terms of perception and of 
substance.   
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Appendix		
Questionnaire Survey 
 
Part 1 :General Information (Please respond by ticking (√) in the appropriate box) 
 
Please indicate your age 
Less than 25 years 
old 
Between 26 and 
30 years old 
Between 31 and 
40 years old 
Between 41 and 
50 years old 
Over 50 years old 
         
 
1.1 Please indicate your gender:  M (     ),   F (     ) 
 
2. Are you professionally qualified in accountancy or finance?   Yes (      )  No (      ) 
 
If yes, please indicate which of the following professional qualifications that you have: 
Professional Body   
LAAA   
ICAEW   
CIMA   
ACCA   
AICPA   
Other, please specify ….   
 
3. What is your highest educational qualification? 
Qualification   
Diploma   
Bachelor degree   
Master degree   
Doctorate   
Other, please specify ………   
 
4. Please indicate your place of education for your highest degree 
Place   
Libya   
Other Arab country   
UK   
USA   
Other, please specify ………   
 
5. Please tick your place of work and position 
Place of Work    position 
A commercial bank     
Central Bank of Libya     
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The Libyan Stock Market     
Tax Authority     
Audit Firm     
State Audit     
Current or potential investor     
Academia and Research Centres 
Other, please specify ………     
 
6. Please indicate the work experience, if any, that you have: 
Less than 5 years    Between 5 and 10 years   
Between 11 and 15 years    Over 15 years  
7. Where applicable, please describe any work experience that you have had in the Libyan banking 
sector (e.g. accountant for 5 years, internal auditor for 3 years)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 2 
EM and Audit Quality 
 According to Libyan regulations, only auditors who are listed with the Central Bank of Libya are 
allowed to audit Libyan commercial banks. This restriction implies that those “listed auditors” 
are qualified to undertake an effective audit for banks. To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement  SD  D  NAD  A  SA 
Listed auditors, in practice, are well qualified and 
capable to audit banks 
         
The auditor’s report is relied upon when assessing a 
bank’s financial performance 
         
Listed auditors are likely to detect and deter earnings 
management practices in Libyan commercial banks 
         
An auditor’s ability to report on earnings 
management is compromised by audit fess 
         
An auditor’s willingness to report earnings 
management breaches  is compromised by confliction 
of interest to an auditor’s independence 
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The external auditor can prevent the practice of EM 
using the power of the auditor’s report 
         
 
3.2 Please indicate the extent by which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement  SD  D  NAD  A  SA 
External auditors are fully aware of their 
accountability to the shareholders 
         
External auditors are fully aware of their 
accountability to the third parties 
         
The auditor’s report is widely used by interested  
stakeholders 
         
The auditor’s report is only a legal requirement and 
not used widely in the financial decision making 
process. 
         
 
Presumably,  an  auditor’s  report  is  used  by  several  parties when making  economic  decisions 
regarding  financial  statements. Please  indicate  to what extent you agree or disagree  that  the 
following stakeholders place greater trust in financial statements of Libyan commercial banks as 
a result of the auditor’s report than they would otherwise do: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Users  SD  D  NAD  A  SA 
shareholders           
Management           
Employees           
Tax department           
Current and potential customers           
The Libyan Stock Market           
Central Bank of Libya           
Corresponding banks           
Media           
Academia and research centres           
Society as a whole           
Other, please specify ………………           
 
The researcher would  like to take the opportunity to thank you for filling  in the questionnaire. 
Also, if you would like to receive a summary of the research results and findings please write down 
your name and contact details. Thank you. 
 
Name   
Address   
Email   
Phone number   
Fax number   
 
